Abstract-Aircraft automation designers are faced with the challenge to develop and improve automation such that it is transparent to the pilots using it. To identify problems that may arise between pilots and automation, methods are needed that can uncover potential problems with automation early in the design process. In this paper, simulation and model checking are combined and their respective advantages leveraged to find problematic humanautomation interaction using methods that would be available early in the design process. A particular problem of interest is automation surprises, which describe events when pilots are surprised by the actions of the automation. The Tarom flight 381 incident involving the former Airbus automatic speed protection logic, leading to an automation surprise, is used as a common case study. Results of this case study indicate that both methods identified the automation surprise found in the Tarom flight 381 incident, and that the simulation identified additional automation surprises associated with that flight logic. The work shows that the methods can be symbiotically combined, and the joint method is suitable to identify problematic human-automation interaction such as automation surprise.
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE failure of human-automation interaction that exhibits significant risk to aviation is automation behavior that deviates from what pilots expect. This effect is called "automation surprise" and has been examined by Wiener [1] , Sarter et al. [2] , [3] , and Palmer [4] . A common example of automation surprise in aviation is when the aircraft autoflight mode automatically changes and the pilot is unaware of the change and unable to comprehend the resulting behavior, i.e., "mode confusion." Javaux [5] concluded that mode confusion appears because pilots are not aware of all the preconditions for a given mode change. Javaux's work explained how implicit learning by pilots simplifies or reduces the number of preconditions that trigger a certain mode change to only the preconditions that are salient and consistently experienced. Preconditions for intended mode changes that are not salient, and are almost always satisfied, are forgotten as there is little evidence of their existence. Circumstances in which the forgotten precondition is not satisfied often lead to mode confusion. The challenge presented by automation surprise is that the automation is operating as designed. Yet, the flight crew is still unable to predict or explain the behavior of the aircraft. It is clear that the problem lies with a mismatch between the pilot's expectation, which is driven by his/her mental model of the autoflight system, and the underlying control logic. Leveson et al. [6] analyzed flight deck automation and proposed ways to mitigate "Technology-Induced Human Error" by making changes to the system while still in the conceptual phase.
To be able to investigate system behavior and predict automation surprises and other potential problems that may arise between collaborators in such systems, a method for designers is needed that investigates not just autoflight system validation, but the pilot's understanding of how it works.
Two computational methods that have been used to investigate human-automation interaction are model checking and human performance modeling and simulation. Model checking is a method to formally and mechanically analyze whether a model meets a given specification or satisfies given properties. Simulation, as interpreted in this paper, is a method to execute forward in time models of a human agent, a dynamical system and its associated automation. For example, here, we model a pilot and the flight management system (FMS) of a civil aircraft. Both methods have advantages and limitations that are well documented in the literature and tend to complement each other.
This paper seeks to exploit this complementarity by investigating the use of model checking and simulation in combination on a common scenario. This paper extends the work in [7] ; for each analysis method, the paper compares and contrasts the outputs and inputs and examines the assumptions and data requirements. This leads to a method where the two frameworks alternate in analyzing the data, leading to an iterative process. In this study, we begin with the results from the model checking analysis provided by Bass et al. [8] and perform the step from model checking to simulation with the corresponding analysis of the simulation results. This study also includes an initial attempt at the follow on step of using the simulation results for model checking to "close the loop." It is envisioned that this combined approach can be used to analyze autonomy and authority assignments between pilots and automation, the risks such new assignments create, and ultimately how to mitigate these risks. Additionally, the joint applications of these two methods inform the creation of methods for examining human-integrated systems in general.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
We employ two methods for analyzing system behavior and detecting potential problems in human-automation interaction. These are 1) model checking, as previously applied by Rushby and others to automation surprises involving the Airbus A320 [9] , Boeing 737 [10] , and MD-88 [11] , and 2) human performance simulation, as applied to automation surprises by Corker and colleagues [12] and as applied to the study of function allocation by Pritchett et al. [13] - [15] . Model checking and human performance simulation are two distinct analysis methods, both having their advantages and limitations.
A. Model Checking
Model checking belongs to a family of techniques in computer science referred to as "formal methods." These use mathematical logic to construct models of systems and their environments and then apply various forms of automated deduction to analysis of those models. There is generally a tradeoff between the expressiveness of the logic, theories employed, and the degree and effectiveness of the automation that can be applied to their analysis.
Model checking is at the highly automated end of the spectrum and sacrifices expressiveness to achieve this. Thus, basic model checkers are able to determine whether a finite-state system description satisfies a specification written in temporal logic. Technically, they check if the system is a Kripke model of the specification: hence the name "model checker." If the specification is not satisfied, the model checker can construct a counterexample that drives the system description through a scenario to manifest the violation.
Formal methods began to be applied to human-automation interaction in the late 1990s. For example, Butler et al. described how formal methods could assist human factors through "a deeper scrutiny of the internals of the automation" and advocated their use in describing and avoiding mode confusion [16] . This work employed interactive (i.e., not fully automated) theorem proving to check whether a system design exhibits features that Leveson and colleagues had identified as having a historical association with mode confusion [6] ; there is no explicit model of the human operator in this approach. Lüttgen and Carreño used model checking to bring increased automation to this approach [17] . Degani and Heyman described a formal method for modeling and analysis that includes an explicit "user model" for the human operator [18] , but conducted their analysis by hand. Rushby [11] seems to have been the first to combine the full automation of model checking with an explicit "mental model" for the human operator. Other work along related lines includes efforts by Javaux and Polson [19] , Buth [20] , and Palanque and Paternò [21] . Much of the subsequent work concerns more sophisticated models of the human operators and their cognition, such as work by Curzon et al. [22] , [23] , and more nuanced formulations of mode confusion [24] . Relatively little of this work concerns more realistic models of the controlled plant, which is the focus here. One exception is the work of Oishi et al. [25] , who use (then) state-of-the-art methods for hybrid systems analysis to show that the interface presented to users is a true abstraction of the state of the plant; however, no explicit model of the human user is employed.
The appeal of model checking (and formal methods in general) as an analysis technique is that it considers all possible behaviors of the modeled system; therefore, it is certain to find a violation of the specification if one exists and can prove correctness otherwise. The limitation of model checking is that its underlying technology is automated deduction, where all problems are at least NP-hard, and therefore, the model cannot be too large or too complicated if the analysis is to complete in a reasonable time. Consequently, the full or "concrete" system model must often be considerably simplified before it can be model checked. If the simplified model is a true abstraction of the concrete model (i.e., includes all its behaviors), then safety properties proved of the abstraction are also true of the concrete model; the converse may not be so, however, because a property that is true of the concrete system may fail in model checking because the abstraction is too coarse (i.e., the model has been oversimplified, leading to spurious counterexamples).
To apply model checking to human-automation interaction problems, we compose models of the automation (often a complex state machine), the controlled plant (typically a hybrid system whose dynamics are described by differential equations that change as the plant enters and leaves different "modes"), and human expectations about future states (often a "mental model" represented as a state machine), and look for divergences between expectations and the true state. To make analysis feasible, the models of the plant and of the automation usually must be drastically simplified (e.g., time may not be accurately modeled, or the plant may even be omitted altogether), which can result in spurious counterexamples. Each counterexample must then be examined by hand to see if it suggests a concrete scenario that manifests a genuine problem, or is spurious. If it is spurious, the abstraction must be refined to eliminate the responsible oversimplification, and the whole process repeats.
Due to the difficulties of constructing effective abstractions, interpreting counterexamples, and refining abstractions to eliminate those that are spurious, analysis by model checking has, until recently, been impractical for all but fairly basic humanautomation interaction problems [26] . However, model checking technology has advanced considerably over the years and is no longer limited to finite-state systems; for example, the socalled infinite bounded model checkers can handle models that include mathematical integer and real values [27] , and checkers for hybrid systems allow these values to be related by differential equations. Thus, modern model checkers need not force such oversimplified models that analysis of human-automation interaction is bedeviled by spurious counterexamples. Furthermore, if model checking and simulation could employ similar models, then the loop involving generation and examination of counterexamples could be tightened: Rather than examine counterexamples by hand to see if they suggest a true problem or are spurious, the abstract counterexample could be "concretized" and used to drive a high-fidelity simulation. That is the direction explored here; therefore, we next introduce the simulation technology that we employ.
B. Human Performance Simulation
Thus, human-automation interaction has been more generally analyzed using a combination of human-in-the-loop studies and fast-time human performance simulation where the humans are modeled, usually as independent agents, to capture the aspects of human perception and cognition of interest to the study at hand. Prime examples of such an agent-based modeling approach used in the aviation domain are the MIDAS simulation created by Corker and Smith [12] , Brahms [28] , and WMC (Work Models that Compute) [13] , [14] . These human performance simulations focus on the interaction between humans and automation and are often modeled using agent-based structures. Agent-based simulations are fundamentally different from equation-based simulation in that agent-based simulations consist of a set of agents which seeks to emulate the behavior of a system, in our case pilots, aircraft dynamics, and the aircraft autoflight systems, whereas equation-based simulations consist of a set of differential equations that are evaluated [29] . Agentbased simulations have the ability to use a variety of timing mechanisms (continuous, discrete event, or hybrid) to account for the dynamics of the systems under analysis and generally include hundreds of states when all agents (human agents and automated agents) are included. When applied to problems of human-automation interaction in aviation, Pritchett and Feigh [14] and Lee and Pritchett [30] showed how hybrid timing allows the dynamics of an aircraft, which are well represented by differential equations (requiring small time step), and the decision making of human agents, which are well represented by discrete events (having no specified time steps), to maximize computational efficiency.
Agent-based simulations of human performance utilize models of the aircraft and human agents, which are significantly more complex than those employed in model checking. The number of states covered, the initial conditions needed, and the output data generated can be prohibitively large. In fact, most agent-based simulations are initially programmed in a deterministic manner to allow reproducibilility of results and to facilitate verification and debugging of the code. Stochasticity can then be systematically introduced into the simulation as desired to investigate specific parameters of interest. Similarly, simulations are commonly programmed to simulate normative behaviorthat is the correct behavior of an agent. Simulating agent errors or mistakes must normally be specially programmed in as part of a specific scenario or may be included as a part of the stochastic element of the simulation. As the number of potential erroneous actions can be very large, these situations are often included to answer specific research questions.
A fundamental limitation of simulation as a method is that it is limited to exploring one trace through the state space per "run." Thus, to more fully explore the state space, multiple simulation runs are required. Common simulation analysis techniques, such as Monte Carlo methods, attach probability distributions to key input variables and then randomly sample from the distributions to perform thousands of simulation runs. Monte Carlo methods for simulation have been used in air transportation applications since the early 1970s, where they were used to examine methods to improve runway through put [31] .
At a fundamental level, simulations can never exhaustively explore the state space that their models represent and, thus, cannot be used to prove the safety of the modeled system. Simulations can provide more information about the events leading to problems in human-automation interaction and work with sophisticated and realistic models of human agents, automated agents, and their environment [32] . However, simulations depend strongly on the assumptions made, as well as the quality of the modeling and input data.
Model checking and simulation have complementary strengths and weaknesses: Model checking can examine all possible scenarios, but only for simplified models; simulation can examine realistic models, but only a fraction of their scenarios. A method that leverages the strengths of both could allow a much more complete and systematic evaluation of realistic models than current practice. In this paper, we chose to use a combination of Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) model checker and WMC, but the approach advocated here maybe applicable to any model checking and human performance software combination that is capable of modeling a common scenario.
C. Mental Models
Craik [33] seems to have been the first to propose that human interaction with the world is guided by "mental models" concerning the behavior of entities and actors in their environment. Norman [34] performed fundamental work on mental models in the human-computer interaction domain. Through his observations, he came to the conclusions that mental models are incomplete, unstable, unscientific and parsimonious. Doyle and Ford [35] reviewed the literature on mental models in domains involving dynamical systems and defined a mental model as "a dynamic system [that] is a relatively enduring and accessible, but limited, internal conceptual representation of an external system whose structure is analogous to the perceived structure of that system." Doyle et al. [36] suggested a method to analyze these mental models in a study where they were trying to measure the effectiveness of systems interventions in promoting learning. In this study, they performed systematic interventions, in which the goal was to move participants toward a shared understanding and shared mental model. Their method proved to be capable of capturing even subtle changes in mental models due to these interventions. Romera and Javaux independently used finite automata to represent mental models. Romeara [37] created state charts representing the mental model. Her overall result indicated that the closer the mental model to the conceptual model, the better the performance. Javaux used state machines of aircraft mode control logic and the complex conditionals to demonstrate how difficult it is for human pilots to maintain an adequate mental model of the autoflight system given its complexity and human implicit learning.
III. AUTOMATION SURPRISE
In this section, we define automation surprise for this work. First, an example scenario is presented in which an automation surprise is linked to automation logic formerly employed in certain Airbus aircraft. Then representation and analysis of this scenario in model checking and simulation are described and the two methods are compared.
A. Example Scenario: A320 Speed Protection
The example used here employs a known automation surprise found in previous versions of Airbus models A300, A310, and A320 as a case study. An unexpected automatic flight mode change, a so-called mode reversion, could be initiated during approach by the automatic speed protection logic without the crew's knowledge. Due to several automation surprise incidents related to this logic it was later changed; however the previous version of the automatic speed protection logic serves as an instructive case study. The open modes ignore any flight path angle or vertical speed previously commanded by the crew and rely on the altitude entered in the Flight Control Unit (FCU). If the FCU altitude is set to an altitude above the current altitude, the automation switches into the OPEN CLB flight mode and starts climbing. In descent, this mode change (into OPEN CLB) results in an automation surprise for the pilots, who are attempting to land but unexpectedly find the aircraft strongly climbing. The most prominent example where this flight mode logic almost led to an accident was Tarom flight 381 [38] involving an Airbus A310 traveling from Bucharest to Paris Orly in 1994. The mode reversion to OPEN CLB during descent/approach caused the aircraft to climb steeply; the pilots were surprised and attempted to force the aircraft back into descent causing the aircraft to stall and lose over 3000 ft in altitude before the pilots recovered at an altitude of 800 ft.
To examine the benefits and limitations of the methodology presented in this work, the Tarom flight 381 scenario was modified to serve as an example scenario. In the TAROM flight, during descent the crew failed to capture the Instrument Landing System (ILS) glide slope which is necessary to allow the autoflight system to aid the crew with landing. The crew, then above the glide slope, attempted to return to the correct path by descending steeply. During the dive the crew deployed the flaps prematurely, lowering the maximum speed at which it is safe to operate the aircraft. The speed of the aircraft exceeded safe bounds triggering the mode reversion into an OPEN mode. The altitude in the FCU at the time was above the current altitude as the pilots had already set it to the "go around" altitude, which is the altitude to be used in case of an aborted landing.
The example scenario was modified from the TAROM flight for two reasons. First, we wished to eliminate the need to simulate the crew error of failing to capture the ILS. Second, we wished to investigate the parameters surrounding the diveoverspeed-mode reversion sequence to fully explore the state space where the mode reversion would occur. The modified scenario is shown in Fig. 1 . Here, instead of accidentally overshooting the glide slope, the pilots are instructed by air traffic control (ATC) to level off after capturing the ILS glide slope, thus requiring them to leave the glide slope and hold a constant altitude. Subsequently, ATC releases the aircraft back to their original flight path, forcing them to descend steeply to recapture the glide slope. This allows the simulation to vary both the altitude and duration of the ATC intervention. The longer the aircraft is commanded to hold the altitude, the steeper the FPA is required to regain the glide slope, and the more the aircraft accelerates. Although made up for this investigation, ATC may issue such an instruction if the airspace is congested or the runway is still occupied.
This incident is interesting as it involves the correct functioning of autoflight control logic, yet resulted in unacceptable behavior of the joint human-automation system. The control logic acted in such a way as to surprise the pilots, and in the case of Tarom flight 381, for the pilots to fight the autoflight system until the aircraft stalled. It is this interaction of autoflight logic, context, and human response variability that form the difficulties in identifying and analyzing human-automation interaction problems.
B. Definition of Automation Surprise
Palmer [4] defines "when the automation behaves in a manner that is different from what the operator is expecting" as an automation surprise. Here, it is applied to the aircraft as a system, with the pilot as the operator and the aircraft's autoflight system as automation, which includes both the autopilot and FMS. A key challenge in modeling automation surprises, such as the automation surprise linked to the described Airbus speed protection logic, is the inclusion of the pilot's mental model, beliefs about the current state of the aircraft and expectations about the future state of the aircraft. Here, the mental model describes the pilot's understanding of the (automation) system. The pilot's expectations about the behavior of the aircraft are based on the pilot's belief about the aircraft's current flight mode and his expectation of the aircraft behavior resulting from this mode. The pilot's expectations are based on his observations about the current state of the aircraft, previous actions and mental model, i.e., understanding of how the aircraft will react to commands given its current state. When the pilot knowingly commands changes, then those changes are expected and anticipated; when this is not the case, any changes are unexpected and surprise the pilot.
Expectation of aircraft behavior can be decomposed into three basic components: 1) direction; 2) magnitude; and 3) timing.
An example of such an expectation is an expected pitch change (aspect of dynamics of aircraft behavior) in which the pilot expects a certain direction (climb, descent, level), at a given rate (vertical rate) and at a certain time (e.g., now, in 2 min or at a certain waypoint). More concretely, when the pilot knowingly commands a descent with the vertical rate of 1000 ft/min and engages the proper vertical pitch mode, then the expectations are:
1) direction: descent; 2) magnitude: 1000 ft/min; 3) time: now. In this case study, the pilot purposefully commanded the change by setting vertical speed and engaging the vertical pitch mode. If following such a command the plane failed to descend or began to climb due to a misunderstanding of the autopilot logic, this would be an automation surprise.
An automation surprise does not necessarily involve the automation acting in an unexpected way resulting from system changes. It may also be caused by an operator purposefully initiating changes that result in unanticipated consequences. For example, if the pilot pushes a button and the aircraft behaves in a different way than he is expecting, this can also be designated as an automation surprise. Another possibility of a non-traditional automation surprise is when the pilot forgets to perform a required action and unexpected actions are performed by the system. An example of such an automation surprise is a One-Two-GO Airlines flight 269 [39] in 2007 involving an MD82. In this flight, the pilots forgot to push the TO/GO (Takeoff/Go Around) button and were surprised by the subsequent actions of the aircraft. Obviously, this does not depict a typical automation surprise; nevertheless, the pilots were surprised by the performance of the automation.
C. Detecting and Modeling Automation Surprises in Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
To detect an automation surprise in the SAL model checker, the occurrence of an automation surprise is modeled as the reachability of an undesired state: one in which the mental state of the pilots (e.g., "we are in descent") differs from the actual state of the airplane (e.g., altitude is increasing).
SAL, like most model checkers, works by examining the states and transitions of the given model to determine if such undesired states are reachable. Some kinds of model checkers actually enumerate the reachable states, while bounded model checkers reduce the reachability of undesired states (within a bounded number of steps) to a constraint satisfaction problem that can be solved by a SAT (Boolean satisfiability problem) or SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) solver.
Despite the power of these solvers, models generally need to be simplified quite considerably to make model checking tractable. Since the example concerns an automation surprise in the vertical dimension (climbing when descent is expected), we eliminate the horizontal dimensions and the roll and yaw axes, and model only the aircraft elevation (with its rate of change) and the pitch axis.
We must then decide how accurately and completely to model the aircraft dynamics in the vertical axis. In the earliest treatment of this example [9] , the dynamics were eliminated altogetherin fact, the entire plant (i.e., the aircraft) was omitted and only the automation and the human were modeled: a surprise was deemed to have occurred if the automation commanded climb when the mental model was "descend." A valid objection is that this is an excessive abstraction and that the pilots will experience a true surprise only if the aircraft actually does climb when they expect descent. This requires a plant model and the challenge is to represent this with adequate fidelity while still allowing efficient model checking.
A full plant model is a hybrid automaton: The automation commands changes in pitch and thrust, the pilot can select flap settings, and the effect of these on aircraft elevation is described by differential equations. The control laws of the automation may also involve derivatives. Formal analysis of hybrid automata is a very challenging problem; therefore, they are generally abstracted to approximations described by conventional automata. One class of methods (e.g., [40] ) partitions the continuous variables (e.g., elevation and its derivative) into discrete segments (e.g., the derivative of elevation may be approximated by just three values: negative, zero, and positive) and then calculates an approximation of the continuous dynamics on these discrete ranges.
A powerful modern method of abstraction (called relational abstraction) retains the full state space as a tuple of continuous values (e.g., elevation is modeled as a real number) but approximates the state transitions on these by a relation [41] . That is, the full model provides differential equations that allow calculation of the exact elevation some given time in the future, whereas the relational abstraction merely indicates all the values it possibly could have some time in the future (if it stays in the same mode). For example, if pitch angle is positive, then the elevation anytime in the future (unless some new mode becomes active) will be greater than its current value.
There are two ways to construct a relational abstraction. One way is to build a crude one by hand and simply assert it as the model. This can be appropriate when accurate models of the true dynamics are not available or not required. We previously hypothesized that this would be so for human-automation interactions and the work reported in [8] took this approach. There, the dynamics of the aircraft are represented by rules of the form mentioned earlier: e.g., if pitch angle is positive, then future values of the elevation state variable will be greater than its current value. These relations are specified to the model checker using synchronous observers [42] . Another way to construct relational abstractions is by symbolic analysis of the eigenstructure of the differential equations appearing in a hybrid automaton. Methods for doing this are described in [41] and are mechanized in Hybrid SAL [43] . This approach was used in our second model-checking examination of the example explored in this paper (the first was the examination reported in [8] and summarized below).
The scenario described previously was examined by model checking using the SAL suite of model checkers from SRI [44] (where expectations are referred to as mental models) and is referred to throughout this paper as Bass et al.'s [8] scenario. The implementation is thoroughly described in [8] and will only be covered briefly here. The model contains three components: automation (the autopilot and autothrottle), pilots (all aspects of human-automation interaction), and airplane (the dynamics of the aircraft with its engines in a rudimentary abstraction). Additionally, a constraints module encodes the aircraft dynamics using a synchronous observer that defines suitable constraints (e.g., if the pitch angle is positive, altitude in the next state must be no less than its current value) and restricts model checking to states that satisfy these constraints. A final module in the form of another synchronous observer is added to seek out the automation surprise, should it occur. This module raises a flag should the state of the mental model differ from the behavior of the aircraft (e.g., the mental state is "descent" but the aircraft altitude is actually increasing). The model checker is used to check the (false) claim "flag is never raised" and produces a counterexample that represents a scenario leading to an automation surprise.
In model checking, pilots' expectations are represented explicitly and are separate from the model of the dynamical system. These expectations are represented by a "mental state" variable that records the different vertical behaviors of the aircraft: climb, level, and descend. The actual vertical behavior of the aircraft is represented by the change in value of its altitude state variable from one state to the next. When expectation and reality do not correspond an automation surprise is flagged. Table I shows a counterexample produced by SAL with the sequence of steps leading to the automation surprise. At Step 1, in the initial state of the SAL model, the aircraft is in cruise and the pitch is level; the pilot then sets dials to cause the aircraft to descend. In Step 2, the pilots' expectation is descend, the aircraft initiates the descent, and the pilot issues no further vertical control commands. Consequently, the pilots' expectation remains that the aircraft will descend as originally commanded. Next, the pilot extends the flaps and, in Step 3, the flaps extension leads the automation to set a lower maximum speed. The aircraft speed is above this new maximum, and in Step 4, this overspeed causes the automation to change mode to OPEN CLB. In Step 5, the aircraft automation actually initiates a climb. When the automation commands the climb, the pilots' expectation about future states of the aircraft remains descend, since the change was not commanded. In Step 6, the pilots' expectation is violated when the aircraft starts climbing. The difference between reality in Step 6 (altitude increases significantly, hence climbing) and expectation (descend) causes the model checker to signal an automation surprise.
D. Automation Surprises in Work Models That Compute
Similar to model checking, an expectations construct for human agents is required in WMC to simulate an automation surprise. In contrast to model checking, WMC includes a greater number of actions and more detailed actions, and they are defined in a work model describing the joint work that is separate from the agent models. The work model contains the knowledge of how to perform the work in the form of actions, and passes the actions to the agent model to be executed. Agents control the exact order of execution of the actions assigned to them. For a detailed explanation of WMC and the role of agents, see [15] , [45] . Fig. 2 illustrates how automation surprise is modeled in WMC. Every time the human agent monitors an aspect of the environment (a monitoring action), the agent's internal belief about the value of that element is updated. The belief construct creates a copy of the current state of environmental variables, such as altitude or speed of the aircraft, every time a monitoring action takes place or when the pilot performs an action that leads to changes in the environment. The frequency of monitoring actions determines the latency of the values in the belief construct. Another feature of the belief construct is a history trace. To be able to monitor the change of belief over time, the past ten values of each belief are stored. The history makes it possible to monitor the change in belief for a specific variation, such as pitch over time, which allows the agent to track the trend change and draw conclusions about the behavior of the aircraft based on a mental model.
The belief is then processed by the agent's mental model and the action is executed based on the agent's internal understanding of the state of the world (its belief). The expectation variables are independent from the belief construct and are encoded as either positive, negative, or neutral. For each of the four basic aircraft variables the direction is interpreted differently. For the altitude and airspeed, this indicates whether it is increasing, decreasing or level/constant. For the vertical speed, this means whether it is positive, negative or neutral. Finally, for the heading, the current heading (or the belief about the current heading) is compared to a theoretical heading computed to reach the next waypoint.
Expectations are compared with the agent's belief as the beliefs are updated. An automation surprise monitoring action compares expectations and beliefs. To be able to compare these two, it is necessary to transform the belief to make it comparable to the expectation. This means the belief has to be transformed to positive, negative, or neutral depending on which of the four basic aircraft variables is considered. For example the belief about altitude has to be transformed to increasing, decreasing, or stable depending on the direction the last ten values show. If the pilot's expectation does not correspond to his belief, then an automation surprise is flagged. A threshold is set to make sure that the changes are not just within normal fluctuation.
Expectations are built on the basis of the mental model about the flight mode logic. Some flight modes take the FCU values into account to construct the flight path plan, such as VNAV modes. When such a flight mode is engaged and the pilot is aware that it is engaged, his expectations about the altitude and the vertical speed are formulated depending on the FCU selected altitude and vertical speed. Other flight modes, such as G/S, which capture the glide slope of the ILS, do not depend on any of the FCU-selected values, which means the pilot consistently expects the aircraft to descend. However, in flight modes that take FCU values into consideration, such as VNAV modes, the pilot builds his expectation based on the FCU values. This structure makes the creation of a mental beliefs construct in WMC straightforward, as the belief construct can update itself in the background every time the human agent acts/initiates actions which cause state changes in the environment. Fig. 2 shows how an automation surprise is flagged when belief and expectations do not match and that beliefs are updated by observing the state of the aircraft (reality). The expectations construct formulates the agent's expectation based on the actions he performs that cause changes in aircraft behavior. Reality, belief, and expectation are the key constructs to detecting automation surprises.
In this study, four basic aircraft variables are used to create the pilot's expectation: altitude, airspeed, vertical speed, and heading. Automation surprises result from the violation of the pilot's expectations of these variables and variables to which they are closely linked. Specifically, the additional variables include aircraft position (heading) and the throttle (airspeed). These six values are sufficient to model most types of automation surprises that can lead to dangerous aircraft behavior.
To formulate expectations, the aircraft control inputs and flight mode must be known. Different flight modes follow different guidance logic. Depending on the flight mode, there are different target values the aircraft tries to maintain or achieve, which include airspeed, vertical speed, altitude, latitude, longitude, throttle, heading, FPA, and timing values. If the flight mode is known, it is possible to formulate expectations. For instance, the flight mode "ALT HOLD" leads to the expectation that the altitude will remain the same; a sudden climb or descent without a pilot intervention or an expected automation change leads to an automation surprise.
E. Comparison of Simulation Using Work Models that Compute to Model Checking Using Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
This section compares the models used in WMC and SAL and the functionalities of simulation and model checking in general. Table II summarizes the differences between WMC and SAL and the difference in the respective models used for this study. The pilot expectations in the SAL model are rudimentary, only comprising the vertical behavior (i.e., acceleration) of the aircraft. This means that for each state transition where expectations change, the change needs to be explicitly defined by the modeler. When extending the expectations to comprise more properties than vertical acceleration, all the changes in expectations have to be explicitly stated. In contrast, the WMC model provides a belief construct that is created and updated automatically. Whereas in the SAL model a difference between expectations and the state of the aircraft (in this case vertical acceleration) flags an automation surprise, in the WMC model it is the difference between pilot's expectations and beliefs. In the following section, the way these two approaches work together and how the combination of both can lead to a more robust method to uncover automation surprises given the shortcomings of both methods, simulation and model checking, is described.
IV. METHOD
The objective of this research is to analyze a common scenario using both model checking and simulation to illustrate how the two analysis methods could be used in combination. Fig. 3 shows one possible method for combining the two analysis techniques. A scenario narrative can serve as a starting point. Since model checking can explore all possible states in a simple and highly abstracted model, it is used first to find event sequences, which violate the property specification. Here, the narrative based on Tarom flight 381 is used to guide model creation and property specification in SAL, which are then exhaustively explored. In this work, SAL checks for aircraft behavior that differs from the expectations of the pilot, i.e., an automation surprise.
In the next step, as shown in Fig. 3 , the event sequences or preconditions that the SAL counterexample trace reveals are the necessary preconditions for the examined scenario (such as an automation surprise) to occur, and are given to WMC. The preconditions describe the states and transitions that eventually lead to the specification violation. The requirements that are necessary to recreate the SAL preconditions are then modeled in WMC as a scenario. Scenario creation in WMC requires consideration of a significantly larger number of variables (because the SAL models are heavily abstracted), and comparable scenarios must be carefully designed by hand. Specifically, the initial conditions and procedures need to be defined prior to running the simulation. In most cases, simulations are created that are both normative and deterministic so that they may be checked for errors. Once properly verified, stochastic elements or off-nominal occurrences or behaviors can be interjected. The simulation then must be run enough times to capture the variability of interest often using either a full factorial design of experiments or a Monte Carlo approach, both of which are likely to require hundreds or thousands of runs. Depending on the complexity of the simulation and speed of the computational hardware this can take several minutes to several days.
In the subsequent step, the results of the scenario runs in WMC provide a more concise description of the preconditions that lead the examined scenario to appear, if the scenario appears at all. These results will provide feedback on whether the scenario in SAL is realistic and under which conditions it is likely to occur.
Building on SAL's finding, WMC provides a realistic set of scenarios if it appears under the preconditions provided by SAL. These scenarios include a more precise description of the preconditions under which the specification violation (here an automation surprise) occurs and an outline of the sequence, timing, and duration of events in the scenario.
In this paper, we begin with the results in hand from the initial Model Checking analysis as documented in Bass et al. and summarized in Section III-C. We describe and present the results from the subsequent steps: Creation of Simulation based on Model Checking results and Analyze using simulation. We then complete the loop and present the changes made to the Model Checking modeling approach and subsequent results and analysis.
V. SIMULATION ANALYSIS

A. Experimental Design
In contrast with model checking where the abstracted model can be exhaustively searched within seconds (the equivalent of running thousands of simulation runs), simulation is restricted to evaluating one path through the state-space included in its model at a time. Thus, care must be taken to determine which subset of the state space is of interest and to create a design of experiments to explore that space.
The goal of the WMC simulation in this analysis is to: 1) verify that the action sequence predicted by SAL to be problematic continues to be problematic; 2) refine SAL's prediction to include specific temporal relationships between events. Scenarios were created following a full factorial design of experiments in this case study. All of the variables included in Table III impact the occurrence of an automation surprise linked to the Airbus automatic speed protection logic. To provoke an automation surprise, adequate yet realistic values have been selected. The preconditions that were shown in [8] to cause an automation surprise were used for the scenarios, making it possible to see whether these same preconditions also lead to an automation surprise in WMC. 
B. Results
The results of the simulations of the case study verify the results of the Bass et al.'s [8] analysis hold (description in Section III-C.) and uncover several other potentially dangerous scenarios linked to the automatic speed protection. Specifically, if the automatic speed protection was still implemented in its original form, additional types of potentially dangerous scenarios involving an automation surprise could occur. These are not limited to the way the automation surprise appeared in the Tarom 381 incident.
1) Bass et al.'s Matching Case [8]:
The WMC dynamic aircraft model (Large Civil Transport Aircraft similar to a Boeing 747, validated in previous human-in-the-loop studies [46] ) is modified from its standard large transport aircraft to make the Bass et al. (Airbus A310 model) scenario appear with the same or a similar altitude profile. Specifically, the aircraft model was modified to match the maximum speed of the Airbus model used in SAL, and the target speeds were adjusted to fit the assumptions made in SAL. The level off was commanded at about 3000 ft, and flaps extension was forced to be performed after the level off. When these preconditions are given, the scenario appears as described in Bass et al. Fig. 4(a) and (b) compares these two altitude profiles. Since SAL only models discrete states, altitude points connected by straight lines are drawn. Fig. 5 shows an example of the same automation surprise identified by the SAL analysis (due to the factors described previously). Here, however, the surprise occurs at a "go around" altitude of 6000 ft instead of the actual 3291 ft. In this scenario, the aircraft levels off at 5000 ft and not at 3000 ft, which fulfills the condition given in SAL that the aircraft descends after leveling off. The aircraft descends and flaps are extended, which leads to the overspeed and the mode reversion to OPEN CLB. At level off, the expectation of the pilot is level flight; then, when the aircraft descends, it changes to descent and stays this way until the aircraft starts climbing which leads to an automation surprise flag.
2) Overspeed Causes in the Work Models That Compute Simulations: WMC's standard transport aircraft dynamics and operational procedures modeling, waypoints, and maximum speeds were used for the exploration of the state space with the four independent variables listed in Table III . For the statespace exploration, a level off is requested by ATC causing the aircraft to deviate from the glide slope after which the aircraft dives to recapture the glide slope. This simulates the aircraft having to recapture the glide slope as in the Tarom incident. In the state-space exploration simulations, overspeeds generated by both the premature extension of flaps reducing the maximum speed and the dive appeared individually, as well as an overspeed as a result of both causes. The combination of both causes means the aircraft dove to recapture the glide slope, extending the flaps decreased the maximum speed and the dive made the aircraft reach this new maximum speed. A purpose of the WMC simulation was to search for a more generic state of automation surprise arising out of the combination of the independent variables manipulated. The simulations showed three different outcomes, mode reversions to OPEN CLB or OPEN DES and outcomes without a mode change. These outcomes were grouped based on their causes.
Outcomes were grouped by the particular behavior the aircraft performed and the appearance of an automation surprise in a simulation run. Several variables influenced the outcome: 1) Whether an overspeed appeared leading to the mode reversion. 2) If an overspeed appeared, then whether the FCU altitude was above the current altitude or below leading to OPEN CLB or OPEN DES. 3) If mode reversion occurred, then whether an automation surprise appeared. Due to the larger number of simulation runs, regularities appeared, which allowed the grouping of different runs into the same category of an outcome.
Given the number of independent variables and the complexity of an actual simulation comprising flight dynamics, four such outcomes appeared in the results as described in Table IV . The first mode change (Outcomes 1 and 2) appears due to early flaps extension before the level off, which causes the actual airspeed instantaneously to be greater than maximum. The second mode change (Outcome 3) occurs after the level off during the dive, for the same reason. The third mode change (Outcome 4) occurs during the dive; the pilot extends the flaps at the correct time; however, the dive makes the aircraft overspeed. The following sections describe each outcome that appeared due to the automatic speed protection. Not all of the scenarios resulted in an automation surprise. Only the automation surprise not caused by simulation artifacts are described here, which includes all automation surprises linked to the OPEN CLB mode change, where the aircraft suddenly starts climbing. a) Outcome 1: OPEN DES, flaps extension before level off causes mode reversion: In this outcome, the pilot extends the flaps early, before the level off, which leads to overspeed and mode reversion to OPEN DES because the "go around" altitude is below that of the current altitude. This result is not considered an automation surprise by our definition, i.e., expectations = belief. However, with a more comprehensive definition of automation surprise where any time the autoflight mode is not what the pilot expects, then this situation would qualify. b) Outcome 2: OPEN CLB, flaps extension before level off causes mode reversion: In this outcome, the pilot extends the flaps early, before the level off, which leads to overspeed and mode reversion to OPEN CLB. The subsequent climb to the go around altitude makes the automation surprise appear. For this outcome, the go around altitude is above the level off altitude. Fig. 6 shows the altitude profile of one such outcome and the altitudes and times at which the events occur. Fig. 7(a) shows a range of preconditions that actually lead to this outcome. In this figure, the go around altitude and the level off altitude are fixed. Fig. 7(b) also shows a range of preconditions with the level off duration fixed instead of the level off altitude. c) Outcome 3: OPEN CLB, after level off, flaps extension causes mode reversion: In this outcome, the aircraft discontinues its level off and resumes the descent trying to recapture the glide slope. After a few seconds, flaps are (mistakenly) extended early which leads the aircraft to exceed the speed limit with the new flaps setting. A mode reversion to OPEN CLB leads to a climb and an automation surprise is flagged. Fig. 8(a) shows the altitude profile of one such outcomes and the altitudes and times at which the events occur, and Fig. 8(b) shows a closeup of the times and altitudes around the mode reversion. Fig. 9 shows the preconditions that lead to this outcome. d) Outcome 4: OPEN CLB, dive causes overspeed and subsequent mode reversion: In this outcome, the overspeed appears resulting from the dive and not due to early flaps extension. The pilot extends the flaps after the level off at the correct speed to the next configuration. However, the dive leads the aircraft to speed up and reach the maximum speed with the new configuration and a mode reversion to OPEN CLB. Fig. 10(a) shows the altitude profile of such an outcome and Fig. 10(b) shows a closeup. Fig. 9 shows the preconditions that make this outcome appear.
C. Summary
In summary, with the SAL inputs at 3291 ft go around altitude and flaps extension speed 21 kt above maximum speed [226 kt in WMC], as given in the Bass et al.'s scenario, a full spectrum of automation surprises occurred as shown in Fig. 11 . Additional simulation runs were performed that do not match the Bass et al.'s scenario (described previously in Section III-C completely due to the use of a Boeing-based aircraft dynamics model and the open source guidance logic). Using this modified scenario, it has been further shown that indeed an automation surprise continues to appear as predicted by model checking using SAL. Additionally, the simulation reveals four outcomes, three of which are classified as automation surprises, and one which, while not classified as such, presents an automatic flight mode change which the pilot is unaware which may be equally dangerous.
The simulation results revealed three important items. First, the simulation was able to identify additional failure modes not detected by the model checking analysis. In some outcomes with the two SAL preconditions the automatic speed protection caused a mode reversion to either OPEN CLB or OPEN DES (not flagged as an automation surprise). Second, the simulation results revealed (see Figs. 7, 9, and 11) a complex multidimensional pattern of the interaction of the level off duration and the level off altitude on the different outcomes. Third, the simulation was able to narrow down the specific values of the variables analyzed that can be mapped to the various outcomes. In particular, the simulation was able to describe the level-off duration which would produce an automation surprise. Additionally, our simulations revealed, using a go around altitude of 4000 ft and below no automation surprises due to early flaps extension involving the OPEN CLB mode occurs. Outcome 4 is the exception, which is not caused by early flaps extension.
D. Discussion
The simulation produced three interesting results. First, the simulation was able with the inclusion of a belief, mental model, and expectations constructs to validate the results of the model checker trace using both the exact scenario reported in Bass et al. and for a more generic scenario appropriate for the aircraft dynamics available in the simulation. Second, the simulation was able, using a more liberal definition of automation surprise, to identify three different ways that automation surprise could manifest in the given scenario. The specific outcomes were shown to be highly complex and to be sensitive to the aircraft dynamics such that they depended not just on the action sequence but also timing. Third, even with the expanded dynamics models and definition of automation surprise, the simulation found an additional outcome (Outcome 1) which was outside of the definition of automation surprise used, but was potentially dangerous.
The results have significant implications for pilot control of aircraft using this control logic. First, the complexity which was embedded and illustrated in Figs. 7, 9, 11 would be very difficult for pilots to learn and to remember. The complexity presents a challenge to pilot training and may have contributed to the alteration of the mode logic. Outcome 1 is particularly worrisome as it represents a change from one descent mode to another, which may be hard for the flight crew to recognize. Depending on the difference between the crew's proposed altitude and the altitude listed in the FCU their flight path might be different than intended, and potentially outside the bounds of the safe approach path.
VI. IMPROVED MODEL CHECKING ANALYSIS
We have seen that simulation was able to construct a realistic scenario for an automation surprise based on that discovered by model checking and reported in [8] . That scenario is triggered by premature deployment of the flaps; subsequent simulation experiments discovered a second scenario triggered by a steep dive performed to recapture the glide slope. We are interested in whether this second scenario could have been detected by model checking.
Observe that the second scenario is much more dependent on the detailed dynamics of the aircraft than is the first: We need an accurate model for the way the aircraft accelerates at different pitch angles and throttle settings. Consequently, we replaced the crude relational abstraction of [8] by a true abstraction calculated by the Relational Abstractor of Hybrid SAL [43] . This was calculated from a HybridSAL specification in which the aircraft dynamics are specified by differential equations. However, these equations are crude and not representative of the true dynamics of any aircraft.
Model checking with this new model was able to rediscover the flaps scenario found previously by the model checking. SAL, like most other model checkers, stops after discovering the first instance of specification violation; therefore, we had to force it to seek a second scenario by requiring that the flaps should not be deployed. It succeeded and generated a scenario in which the aircraft dives for a sustained period. The scenario was not realistic, however, and indicated that our HybridSAL model and consequently its relational abstraction are too crude. Rather than refining the Hybrid SAL model (we did not have access to a parsimonious set of differential equations for a realistic aircraft), we used a synchronous observer to "steer" the counterexample in a realistic direction by adding constraints. We then obtained a diving scenario that appears dynamically plausible.
However, what this scenario lacks compared with the one discovered in the simulation is psychological plausibility: It offers us no reason why the pilots should descend so steeply. On the other hand, we could regard that as part of the division of responsibility, model checking finds the basic scenario (prolonged steep descent with the variable fcu_alt set above the final altitude) and the job of simulation is to find a realistic interpretation of this basic scenario. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The experiments reported here show that model checking and human performance simulation can be used in combination to provide an effective method for early detection of potential automation surprises in systems involving human-computer interaction and fairly complex physical plants. Model checking is applied to an abstracted model of the system (typically one in which the plant dynamics are greatly simplified), and any traces that manifest an automation surprise (typically a divergence between the mental state of the human operator and the actual state of the plant or automation) are used to guide a search for fully realistic scenarios in a simulation that combines high-fidelity plant dynamics and detailed human performance models. The two methods are complementary in that model checking can consider all possible cases, within its abstracted model, and is certain to find surprise scenarios if any exist, thereby narrowing the search space for simulation, which can then find truly accurate scenarios.
The method combines the strengths of model checking, i.e., exhaustive analysis of a large state space, with the strengths of hybrid time, agent-based simulation, i.e., explicit modeling of system dynamics and time. The method allows a larger set of scenarios to be analyzed than would be possible using conventional means of human-in-the-loop simulation with high-fidelity simulation.
Topics for further research include how aggressively abstraction should be used in model checking, and how to transition straightforwardly between the two methods. Based on our experiments, we believe that the major states and transitions of software-driven components need to be modeled accurately, the model of human performance needs to be "right," and the plant dynamics can be considerably abstracted. The last of these is highly beneficial because it greatly reduces the computational cost of model checking. An excessively abstracted model will generate "false positives" that can be expensive to examine (by simulation) and then eliminate (by refining the model), while an insufficiently abstracted model will be costly, difficult, or infeasible to model check and will deliver little benefit (model checking will deliver more realistic scenarios, but construction of these is best left to simulation; model checking should just "point the way"). We found that relational abstraction [41] served us well: It reduces hybrid automata (involving differential equations) to standard automata (over real variables, so these are infinite state) that can be analyzed by bounded model checking with an SMT solver.
Presently, the approach requires a significant amount of manual effort to prepare compatible models for the two methods and to translate the output of model checking into useful input values for simulation. Conceptually, the models of software-driven automation and human performance could be the same in both methods, and the plant models used in the simulation could be automatically abstracted for model checking. However, the two methods derive from culturally and historically different fields and employ different representations and modeling styles. Recent work seeks to develop modeling notations that can be used by both methods [8] , and future work should extend this and investigate techniques for automating the generation of models for both methods from a single representation and mediating the iteration between them.
